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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GAYLE BABBITT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. : 
7-ELEVEN SALES CORPORATION 
dba 7-ELEVEN FOOD STORES : 
CORPORATION, : 
Defendant and Appellee 
Case No. 981755-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA PRESIDING 
Scott W. Christensen 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
136 E. South Temple, Ste. 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 363-7611 
David L. Grindstaff 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
3355 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
PARTIES ON APPEAL 
The parties on appeal appear in the caption except 
that defendant and appellee 7-Eleven, Inc. has been mis-identified 
as 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annot. , § 78-2-2(3) (j) and Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 3. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court was correct in granting summary 
judgment for defendant and appellee (hereinafter "7-Eleven") where 
plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter "Babbitt") cannot show as a 
matter of law that 7-Eleven breached any duties owed to Babbitt. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations involved in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable Anne M. 
Stirba dated October 9, 1998 dismissing Babbitt's claims against 7-
Eleven on its motion for summary judgment. 7-Eleven's motion for 
summary judgment was brought following discovery including the 
deposition of Babbitt. 
1. On March 20, 1997, Babbitt commenced this case by filing 
a complaint against 7-Eleven. (R. 1.) 
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2. In her complaint, Babbitt alleged that on or about June 
19, 1996, while walking on a sidewalk in front of a 7-Eleven store, 
she slipped on a mayonnaise package. (R. 2.) 
3. The only evidence in this case regarding how the 
mayonnaise package ended up on the sidewalk or how long it had been 
there is Babbitt's own deposition. (R. 84.) 
4. In her deposition, Babbitt testified as follows: 
Q. Let me ask you some more questions about 
the mayonnaise packet. Do you know how it got 
there? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know how long it had been there? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anybody ever tell you how it had been 
there? 
A. No. 
Q. Was there anything about it that gave you 
any indication as to how long it had been 
there? 
A. No. Well, I figured it had only been 
there, you know, a short time, you know. (R. 
55.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The undisputed facts and law in this case demonstrate that the 
trial court acted appropriately in granting 7-Eleven's motion for 
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summary judgment dismissing all of Babbitt's claims. Summary 
judgment is appropriate in this case because the condition which 
allegedly caused Babbitt to slip and fall was of a temporary 
nature. Because store owners like 7-Eleven are not insurers or 
guarantors of the safety of their business invitees, in order for 
Babbitt to prevail on her claims, she must show that 7-Eleven knew 
or should have known of the hazardous condition and that 7-Eleven 
had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition. 
In this case, 7-Eleven is entitled to summary judgment 
because: a) Babbitt has admitted through deposition testimony that 
she has no idea how the packet got on the sidewalk or how long it 
had been there; b) Babbitt failed to offer evidence that 7-Eleven, 
or its employees, had either actual or constructive knowledge of 
the condition; and, c) Babbitt has failed to establish that 
sufficient time had elapsed so that any exercise of reasonable care 
7-Eleven could have remedied the alleged problem. 
Given that there is no genuine issue of material fact that 
supports Babbitt's claims against 7-Eleven, 7-Eleven respectfully 
requests this Court to uphold the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE, 
Summary judgment is appropriate "where there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving parties entitled to judgment 
is a matter of law." Mills v. Brodv, 929 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 
1996). "Because summary judgment presents only questions of law" 
this Court reviews the trial court's decision under "a standard of 
correctness, according no defference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Id. In fact, this Court "may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any grounds available to the trial court, even 
if it is one not relied upon by the trial court." Otsuka 
Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
When summary judgment is sought, the movant bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the court of the basis for his motion 
and identifying those portions of the record and affidavits, if 
any, he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
In a case where a party moves on an issue for which he would not 
bear the burden of persuasion at trial, his initial burden of 
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production may be satisfied by the showing the court there is an 
absence of evidence in the record to support the non-movant's case. 
"There can be no issue as to any material fact ... when a complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving 
party's case necessarily renders all facts immaterial. Id. 
For purposes of its motion for summary judgment, 7-Eleven did 
not dispute that Babbitt slipped and fell as alleged. Rather, 
Babbitt failed to establish the necessary elements of negligence in 
a slip-and-fall case based on the standards set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals. Specifically, Babbitt is 
unable to show that 7-Eleven had any knowledge of the condition, 
that is, either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge, because 
the condition had existed long enough that it should have been 
discovered. Furthermore, Babbitt failed to show that 7-Eleven had 
a reasonable amount of time to remedy the problem. Under these 
circumstances, Utah Appellate Courts have universally held that 
there is no liability on the part of landowners, like 7-Eleven. 
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POINT II. 
BABBITT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE THAT 7-ELEVEN 
EITHER KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE 
MAYONNAISE PACKAGE OR THAT 7-ELEVEN HAD A 
REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO REMEDY THE 
ALLEGED PROBLEM. 
Following the briefing of 7-Eleven's motion for summary 
judgment, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of Merino v. 
Albertsons, 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), a case strikingly similar to 
the case at bar. 
According to the Supreme Court: 
We have repeatedly held that "a business owner 
is not a guarantor that his business invitees 
will not slip and fall." Schnuphase v. 
Storehouse Markets, 918 P. 2d 476, 478 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Preston v. Lamb, 2 0 Utah 2d 
260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968). 
Accordingly, we have recognized only two legal 
theories under which a plaintiff may recover 
against a business owner for injuries arising 
from a slip-and-fall accident. See 918 P. 2d 
at 478. 
The first theory applies in cases 
involving an unsafe condition of a temporary 
nature. In these cases, liability cannot be 
established unless two conditions are met. 
First, a plaintiff must show that the business 
owner knew or should have known of the 
hazardous condition. Second, a plaintiff must 
show that the business owner had enough time 
to remedy the unsafe condition had the owner 
exercised reasonable care, and that the owner 
failed to do so. 
6 
The second theory giving rise to 
liability for slip-and-fall accidents on 
business premises involves unsafe conditions 
of a permanent nature. In such circumstances, 
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant had knowledge of the 
condition; notice is presumed. 
Id. at 468. 
The Utah Supreme Court applied these rules in reversing a 
trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict.1 In Merino, the 
plaintiff slipped and fell on a kiwi fruit while shopping in 
Albertsons produce department. Id. at 467. Approximately one year 
later, the plaintiff had another slip-and-fall accident at almost 
precisely the same location. This time, she slipped on a jalapeno. 
The plaintiff brought suit against Albertsons alleging that 
there was a dangerous condition and that Albertsons was liable for 
her slip and fall. 
Albertsons brought a motion for a directed verdict following 
trial, which was denied. The Supreme Court overturned the trial 
court's decision stating, 
^According to the Utah Supreme Court, "the standard of review 
used in reviewing a district court's legal conclusions in an entry 
of declaratory judgment is the same standard used in reviewing a 
summary judgment. That is, we review the district court's 
conclusions of law for correctness." Board of Education of Alpine 
School District v. Ward, 1999 Utah Lexis 21. Therefore, although 
Merino is a case involving a directed verdict, it is controlling in 
this case as the standard of review is the same. 
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The present case does not involve an 
unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semi-
permanent, nature. Ms. Merino slipped on a 
kiwi in 1993 and then slipped on a jalapeno a 
year later. There is not testimony that the 
floor was permanently covered with fruit or 
vegetable debris. The testimony of 
plaintiff's investigator regarding the 
condition of the floor was gathered from some 
nine visits over a period of approximately two 
years and cannot be said to establish a 
permanently unsafe condition at the time of 
either accident. 
In short, this is a case arising from an 
unsafe condition of a temporary nature. As 
plaintiff, Ms. Merino was required to provide 
evidence that Albertsons knew or should have 
known of the existence of the kiwi on the 
floor (on the first occasion) and the jalapeno 
on the floor (on the second) . No such 
evidence was produced. Consequently, the 
trial court erred in not granting defendant's 
motion for directed verdict. We reverse and 
direct the trial court to enter judgment for 
Albertsons. 
Id. at 468-69. 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court followed well-established Utah 
law regarding slip-and-fall cases. See, Schnuphase v. Storehouse 
Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996) ("the owner of a business is 
a not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and 
fall."); Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 
1977) (upholding summary judgment for store owner slip-and-fall case 
where plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof.) Babbitt, in 
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her brief, does not dispute that she has failed to offer any 
evidence that 7-Eleven or its employees knew, or should have known, 
about the mayonnaise package, or that 7-Eleven had a reasonable 
time to remedy the alleged problem. Instead, Babbitt argues that 
this case falls into the second category of slip-and-fall cases 
identified in Merino. In other words, Babbitt claims that the 
mayonnaise package she allegedly slipped and fell on constitutes a 
"permanent" condition such that 7-Eleven is deemed to have had 
knowledge of its existence and is therefore liable for the fall. 
Babbitt's argument is without merit. 
First, as in Merino, a food item on the ground is not a 
permanent condition. There has been no evidence offered that the 
ground outside the 7-Eleven was permanently littered with 
mayonnaise packages or other food products. In fact, Babbitt 
herself testified that it appeared the package had only been there 
a short period of time. Clearly, such a condition is not 
"permanent". 
In the face of this, Babbitt cites Canfield v. Albertsons, 
Inc. , 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah. App. 1992) . According to Babbitt, 
Canfield stands for the proposition that a defendant landowner can 
be held liable for his "method of operation." (See Brief of 
Appellant at pg. 5.) 
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Babbitt argues that 7-Eleven placed trash cans outside of its 
store, that it sold food to be consumed on the premises and that 
therefore, it had knowledge that mayonnaise packages could be 
dropped by its customers and that it was therefore foreseeable that 
Babbitt could have slipped and fell on these packages. Babbitt 
fails to cite to any evidence in the record that 7-Eleven in fact 
sells food to be consumed on the premises or that 7-Eleven has any 
consistent problem with people spilling food outside this 
particular 7-Eleven store. In the absence of this evidence, there 
is nothing to show that 7-Eleven had any knowledge of the allegedly 
dangerous condition. 
Therefore, Canfield is not applicable to this case. Unlike 
Canfield, there is no evidence that 7-Eleven created a dangerous 
condition simply by placing garbage cans outside of its building. 
As the trial court stated in its order granting 7-Eleven's motion 
for summary judgment: 
While on its face Canf ield appears 
instructive, a closer reading of the case 
indicates it is factually distinguishable. 
Indeed, central to the court of appeal's 
finding in Canfield, was the determination 
that Albertsons had notice of the potentially 
hazardous condition as evidenced by the 
store's placement of empty boxes and its 
instituting a regular schedule for inspecting 
and cleaning the produce section. In the 
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instant case, no similar evidence has been 
offered by the plaintiff. 
Simply placing garbage cans outside of one's place of business 
does not make a landowner liable when someone allegedly fails to 
use those recepticals and litters. If anything, the fact that 
garbage cans are present shows that 7-Eleven took reasonable steps 
to avoid the very accident which occurred. 
Wherefore, because the alleged mayonnaise package constituted 
an unsafe condition of a temporary nature, Babbitt must show that 
7-Eleven knew or should have known of the hazardous condition and 
that 7-Eleven had enough time to remedy the unsafe condition. 
Babbitt has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever on these two 
issues. Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately when it} 
granted 7-Eleven's motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
7-Eleven respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of Babbitt's 
claims against 7-Eleven. 
DATED this A / ^ day of July, 1999. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN, WALLACE & KANELL 
SCOTT WJCHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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